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DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN A
TORT PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION
Stephen R. Brenneman*
During the short-lived Falkland Islands conflict, the computer-
ized radar warning system on the British ship H.M.S. Sheffield
failed to detect an Argentine-launched Exocet missile which sank
the ship. According to one report, the system had been program-
med to recognize the Exocet missile as "friendly," since the British
had these missiles in their arsenal. Because the radar system failed
to react to homing signals that the missile sent out, the missile was
able to hit its mark.'
Less dramatically, a failure of the computer system at the Bank
of New York, which could not be corrected for several days, report-
edly resulted in a four million dollar loss to the bank.2 The system
had been used for buying and selling government securities. As se-
curities came into the bank for its customers, the bank was required
to pay for them. However, because the computer was down, these
securities could not be transferred to the bank's customers. Because
it could not in turn collect from those customers, the bank had to
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1. Lin, The Development of Software for Ballistic-Missile Defense, 253 ScI. AM. 46
(1985). The inclusion of this example herein should not be mistaken as a suggestion that this
type of loss, occurring during an armed conflict, would be the proper subject of a products
liability action. It is only included here as an illustration of the magnitude of loss which
could be traced to a computer defect.
2. DP Nighmare Hits N.Y. Bank, 19 COMPUTERWORLD 1 (Dec. 2, 1985); Bank
Blames Nightmare on Software Flop, 19 COMPUTERWORLD 1 (Dec. 16, 1985).
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borrow heavily to pay for the securities that came in. The computer
problem was eventually traced to the software's inability to handle
an unexpectedly heavy load of business.3
We have been relatively fortunate in the use of computers and
computerized equipment. Although the world is firmly in the grips
of an information and technology age, where computers permeate
nearly every aspect of our lives, there have been very few reported
injuries caused by what could be considered computer malfunc-
tions. Such injuries have occurred, however,4 and, judging by the
number of near misses which have been reported,5 many more such
losses are inevitable.
This article is an attempt to survey and analyze the law of tort
product liability as it applies to defects in computers and computer-
ized equipment. Starting with an assumption that contractual relief
is unavailable to the injured party, the discussion will survey the
state of the law on what damages may nevertheless be recovered in
tort from the manufacturer or retailer of the computer. The main
purpose for this is to alert the unwary practitioner to the issues and
pitfalls involved in prosecuting or defending such an action. The
article is also intended to alert the potential purchaser of a com-
puter or computerized equipment of the need to obtain adequate
protection from certain losses either through a carefully drafted
contract or insurance. In conclusion, the article will suggest a cohe-
sive approach to cases involving tort recovery for injury or loss
caused by computer defects.
I. BACKGROUND
Recovery for damages caused by a defective product is pro-
vided for under the law of product liability. This body of law pro-
vides recovery under general tort theories of negligence and strict
3. See supra note 2.
4. Besides the Falkland Islands incident described previously, another reported inci-
dent involved the death of a factory worker in Kobe, Japan who was crushed by an industrial
robot. However, it is not certain in this instance that the computer had actually malfunc-
tioned. See Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 439 (1983). See also Crash Spur Fixes to F-18, AVIATION W., Dec. 15, 1980, at 24
(where computer error was suspected as cause of crash).
5. Computer malfunctions have caused near misses in the air, CPU Fails, Two Jets
Nearly Collide, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 12, 1979, at I; forced the shut down of five nuclear
reactors, Lin, supra note 1, at 49; caused the wasting of fuel on Skylab which may have been
needed to avert a disaster, NASA Jumbles Skylab Flight Data, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 19,
1979, at 1; and caused the false alert of a world war, Norad System Goofs, Calls Missile Alert,
COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 19, 1979, at 1. See Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8
RUTGERS J. oF COMPUTERS, TECH. AND THE LAW 173 (1982).
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liability and under the contract theory of breach of warranty.
Under negligence, recovery may be permitted if a defect was caused
by failure to use due care in the design or manufacture of a prod-
uct.6 Under strict liability, in most states, recovery is permitted if
the defect caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous to per-
son or property, regardless of fault on the part of the manufac-
turer.7 Under both tort theories the plaintiff may be able to recover
all damages proximately caused by the defect.
Recovery may also be available for breach of warranty. As
part of the sale of a computer system, the manufacturer or supplier
may have made certain express warranties about the product's per-
formance. Other warranties may have been implied by law.'
Where a product is defective, it probably will not be as warranted.9
In a breach of warranty action, recovery may be obtained for all
foreseeable damages caused by the breach.
In many cases recovery may be obtained under all three legal
theories, while in others, recovery may be precluded under one or
more of them. Warranty recovery may be precluded because of
lack of privity. Warranty law also may not provide full relief. As
previously noted, contract recovery is generally limited to those
damages which were reasonably foreseeable at the time of con-
tracting.10 In addition, the contract between the parties may not
6. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984). Negli-
gent products liability does not normally include cases where the basis of the plaintiff's claim
is professional malpractice. For a discussion of malpractice as it applies to computer profes-
sionals, see Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 1979);
Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. N.C.R. Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979), aff'd, reh'g denied
635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). This article assumes that the basis of any negligence claim is a
failure to use due care in some phase of the production of the computer or computerized
product. For this, it is also assumed that the manufacturer owes a duty of care to the injured
party in producing the product.
7. See infra pp. Part II.B. for discussion regarding the various theories of strict
liability.
8. An implied warranty of merchantability is created by the Uniform Commercial
Code(U.C.C.) § 2-314 (1983), Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Usage of Trade.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1983) provides for the creation of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
For purposes of this article it is assumed that the Uniform Commercial Code is applica-
ble to the sale of a computer. However, at least in the case of custom-built software, this may
not in fact be true. Such software may not qualify as "goods" under the Code. See infra note
28.
9. See infra pp. Part II.A for discussion regarding the interrelationship between the
term "defect" and warranty law.
10. See CALAMARI AND PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-15 (2d ed. 1977),
discussing the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see also U.C.C. § 2-
715(l)(a) (1983). Under the U.C.C., however, both personal injury and property damage are
recoverable regardless of foreseeability.
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contain express warranties about the product or its performance
and may exclude implied warranties."1 Finally, the contract may
contain a limitation of liability clause precluding any recovery in a
breach of contract action beyond return of the purchase price.' 2
Because of these limitations on recovery under warranty law, it
is often necessary to rely on tort product liability theories. Under
tort law, considerations of privity, foreseeability and contractual
limitations would not normally exist. 13
Typically, a computer defect causes only economic losses.1 4
The purchaser will have paid for a computer which proves to be
worth less than expected. Claims may also exist for delays in get-
ting the computer up and running, for malfunctions during the
early stages of operation, and for damages associated with down
time. These disruptions may have resulted in lost profits, diverted
personnel time and costs incurred in attempting to fix the problems.
There may also have been a loss of goodwill due to billing errors,
and, in the extreme case, loss of the business altogether.15
Damages from computer defects, however, are not limited to
economic losses. Malfunctions can also cause the loss of valuable
data, the destruction of raw materials and the destruction of other
property because of a computer controlled machine run amok.
11. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides for the exclusion of implied warranties.
12. Limitations of liability are authorized under the U.C.C. §§ 2-718 and 2-719 (1983).
Absent a basis for excluding a limitation clause such as duress, or unconscionability such a
clause will likely be upheld by the courts. See generally Note, Causes of Action in Computer
Litigation: Special Problems for the Small or First Time User, 14 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 327
(1983); Elligett, Enforcing Contract Limitation Clauses in Negligence Actions, 8 FLA. ST. BAR
J. 457 (1984). See also Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1298-1300
(5th Cir. 1980); Aplications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), affid without
opinion, 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978).
13. Strict liability normally cannot be disclaimed. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank
Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 647
P.2d 334 (Mont. 1982); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965). But see Elligett, supra note 12 at 457 discussing Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware
Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983), wherein a limitation of liability clause was upheld to
restrict recovery in negligence as well as breach of warranty. See also Keystone Aeronautics
Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp, 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974), wherein the court concluded that a
manufacturer may disclaim liability under Pennsylvania law for negligence and strict liability
in a contract for sale.
14. Durney, The Warranty of Merchantability and Computer Software Contracts: A
Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 WASH. L. REV. 511, 528 (1984).
15. "According to some estimates, a typical company would lose over 40% of its opera-
tional effectiveness by the fourth day of a major computer outage. Less than 25% of the
company's operations would continue to function after the first week and less than 10% after
the second week." Tarkington & Ulrich, Disaster Recovery Planning - Insuring Against the
Unthinkable, 17 COMPUTERWORLD BUYER'S GUIDE, COMPUTER SYSTEMS, 47 (1983).
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They can also cause personal injury. As previously stated, this arti-
cle will examine the different types of damage which may be caused
by a computer defect and how such damages may be recovered in a
tort product liability action. Because it is the type of injury most
readily suffered, and because it is the area of most controversy, this
analysis will primarily deal with the question of whether and when
economic losses may be recovered. Although this question will be
dealt with chiefly from the standpoint of a computer defect, the
analysis is equally applicable to other products.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Defect
Before embarking on a discussion of the state of the law on the
recovery of damages in tort products liability, it is first necessary to
define certain key terms. The term "defect" as used in this context
refers to that aspect of a computer or other product which makes it
unfit for the ordinary purposes for which it is sold and used. It is a
flaw in the design or manufacture of the computer. 6 This defini-
tion is similar to that for a product which is not merchantable under
the Uniform Commercial Code." It does not require that the flaw
make the product unreasonably dangerous, or dangerous at all. For
example, a computer system would contain a defect if it contains an
error in the software logic which generates improper spreadsheet
calculations.
B. Strict Liability
It is generally accepted that "strict liability" as a separate
cause of action in tort was first recognized in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc. "8 As stated by the Greenman court, "[a] man-
ufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."1 9
As it has evolved, strict liability theory is applied differently
depending upon the jurisdiction involved. There are three generally
16. See Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for 'Economic Loss'
Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966); Note, Recovery of Direct
Economic Loss: The Unanswered Questions of Ohio Products Liability Law, 27 CAsE W. RES.
683, 683 n.1 (1977).
17. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1983).
18. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
19. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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recognized theories.20  In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co.,21 a
theory similar to implied warranty was introduced.22 Under it, the
plaintiff must prove a specific defect in the product which caused
the damage alleged.23 The most generally recognized theory of
strict liability is that adopting the language of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 Under this theory, the plaintiff
must prove that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous con-
dition when it left the defendant's control and that such condition
caused the plaintiff's injuries.25 The third theory, announced by the
California Supreme Court in Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp. ,26 re-
quires only that the plaintiff prove the product contained a defect
which caused the injury. It is not necessary that the product was
either unmerchantable or unreasonably dangerous.27 Unless other-
wise indicated, it will be assumed for purposes of this discussion
that the more narrow Restatement approach applies.28
20. See Note, Products Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure
Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI[-]KENT L. REv. 963, 976 n.66 (1977-78).
21. 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
22. Id. at 611, 182 N.W.2d at 806.
23. For a further explanation of the Cova theory of strict liability, see Dooms v. Stewart
Boiling & Co., 68 Mich. App. 5, 241 N.W.2d 738, 74142 (1976).
24. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) states:
SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL
HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applied although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
25. Id.
26. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972).
27. Id.
28. One issue which has not yet been resolved is whether computer software is a prod-
uct, subject to strict liability analysis. This issue is currently being determined on a ad hoc
basis. If the software is custom made, it will probably be viewed as a service provided to the
purchaser (computer programming service) and not a product. Cf, K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon
Realty Group of Connecticut, Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 813, 816-820 (D. Conn. 1980) (architectural
drawings); Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 789-91 (D. Conn. 1982) (navigational
charis). If mass produced, however, it would more readily be viewed as a product and subject
to strict liability. For a thorough analysis of this question, see Comment, Computer Software
and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 439 (1983); Note, Strict Products Liabil-
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C. Economic Loss
Because every loss or injury must eventually be reduced to
monetary terms in order to be compensable in a civil action for
damages,29 it is not enough simply to define "economic loss" as in-
cluding those damages having a financial impact on the plaintiff.
Economic loss has been characterized as that loss which results
from "failure of the product to perform to the level expected by the
buyer."3 It is commonly measured by "the cost of repairing or
replacing the product and the consequent loss of profits, or by the
diminution in value of the product because it does not work for the
general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold."31
Economic loss does not refer to the type of damage which has
been sustained, such as diminution in value, repair or lost profits. It
refers to the way in which the damage was done. If damage arose
from the fact that the product did not work as expected, it would
normally be considered economic loss. If, however, the damage
arose as a result of some accident or incident, such as a fire, explo-
sion or other similar event, the damage would normally not be con-
sidered an economic loss.
Economic loss is generally contrasted with personal injury and
property damage. Personal injury refers to those damages associ-
ated with a physical injury to a person's body. Even though such
physical injury could result from failure of a product to function as
expected, as in the case of a computerized life support system, this
is nevertheless viewed as outside of the realm of economic loss.
Property damage generally refers to an injury to property other
than the defective product itself.32
As to damage to the defective product, the line between eco-
nomic loss and property damage is often blurred.33 The determina-
ity and Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 373 (1983). For purposes of
this article, it is assumed that strict liability does apply.
29. Although personal injury damages are universally viewed as not being economic
losses, they are generally compensable in terms of medical expenses and lost earnings. These
monetary amounts are as much economic losses to the injured individual as lost profits would
be to a business. Both are based on the intentions and expectations of the parties.
30. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Minn. 1984), citing Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Pur-
chasers for Economic Loss Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966);
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918
(1966).
31. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d at 820-21.
32. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
33. See infra Part VI for discussion.
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tion of whether such damage will be considered "property damage"
will often depend on the manner in which the damage is incurred.
If from a sudden or calamitous event, it is generally considered
property damage.34 If, on the other hand, from deterioration, inter-
nal breakage or depreciation, it will more readily be considered eco-
nomic loss. 3 5
III. WHAT ARE COMPUTER DEFECTS?
Computer malfunctions can occur in the hardware3 6 or the
software. 37 Hardware errors can occur because of a deficient design
in the circuitry or because of incompatibility of the various compo-
nents of the computer.38 For example, in the case of a computer
system designed to control a medical life support system, a design
error might be a failure to include some type of fault-tolerant cir-
cuitry in the system.39 Such deficiency could result in an electronic
signal error going undetected and uncorrected, thereby resulting in
a failure to signal medical personnel when a critical condition
arises.
Hardware malfunctions may also result from manufacturing
34. Id.
35. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977).
36. Hardware is generally defined as the "electric, electronic, and mechanical equip-
ment used for processing data...." SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1985). It is the
tangible portion of the computer system - the cabinets, power supplies, disk and tape drives,
and all internal circuitry.
37. Software is the intangible portion of a computer system-the independent computer
programs which tell the hardware how to perform its tasks. A program is a list of instruc-
tions which tell the computer how to do a specific job. R. MOODY, THE FIRST BOOK OF
MICROCOMPUTERS 11 (1978). Software can be broken down into two types: operating sys-
tems which control the basic functions of the computer, such as reading and writing data or
keeping track of time, and applications programs which perform specific tasks desired by the
user, such as accounting functions or monitoring of a radar system.
Problems may also be found in computer firmware. Firmware refers to computer pro-
grams which are permanently hard wired in a ROM (read-only memory) in the computer.
See SIPPL, supra note 36. It is a hybrid between hardware and software. Firmware may be
defective in its basic design logic or in its wiring.
38. An example of such incompatability would be a power supply in a microcomputer
which generates electromagnetic noise that interferes with the operation of a floppy disk drive
in the same box. Each of the separate units may work perfectly. But when placed within the
same box, they cause the microcomputer to malfunction.
39. A fault-tolerant system is one that contains redundant circuitry to detect or correct
for errors. In the simplest form the circuitry may provide for a check bit which can detect an
error in a bit of information. For every string of bits put into the system, an extra I or 0 bit is
added to the end to make that string always contain an even number of 1 bits. Thereafter,
whenever an odd number of bits is detected in a string, an error is signaled. In its more
sophisticated form, a fault tolerant system contains multiple processors or multiple redun-
dant circuits. Whenever an error is detected, the system switches to a parallel processor or
parallel circuit, and processing continues.
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errors, wherein the producer of the computer simply fails to build it
as designed.
It is more typical for computer malfunctions to occur in the
software. Roughly half of these errors are the result of defects in
design . ' In the example of the H.M.S. Sheffield described earlier,
the failure of the computer programmer to take into consideration
the possibility that an opponent might be using an Exocet missile
would be considered a design defect.41
As with hardware, software errors can also result from manu-
facturing defects. For example, a failure to properly copy software
onto a floppy disk for transmittal to a customer would be consid-
ered a manufacturing error.42
Defects in computers, like many other products, can cause in-
jury to persons or property directly or indirectly. A direct injury
occurs when a defective industrial robot goes out of control and
destroys raw materials with which it is working. In contrast, an
indirect injury can result from a defect in a computer aided design
program. If that program is used by an architect for the design of a
building, and if, in the process, the computer provides information
to the architect which indicates the vertical strength of the design as
being stronger than it really is (for example, a misplaced decimal
point which gives a figure ten times higher than the actual number),
this may lead to collapse of the building and significant injuries.43
IV. RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LOSSES GENERALLY
It is generally accepted that personal injury and property dam-
age may be recovered in a tort product liability action. However,
there has traditionally been a split of authority as to whether eco-
nomic losses, when the only damages suffered, are recoverable. 44
40. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), for a description of design defects as recognized under California law.
41. Lin, supra note 1, at 53.
42. For a thorough discussion of the various ways a computer can malfunction, includ-
ing the many ways a software program can become defective, see Gemignani, supra note 5.
43. It has been suggested that use by an architect or engineer of a computer aided
design system may hurt the overall design quality of the structure. The designer no longer
has control of all of the individual presumptions and parameters going into the design. See
Peck and Hock, Liability of Engineers for Structural Design Errors: State of the Art Consider-
ations in Defining the Standard of Care, 30 VILL. L. REV. 403, 434 (1985). Use of such a
system might conceivably be viewed as malpractice on the part of the designer. If so, how-
ever, it is certain that the designer would seek indemnity from the computer system supplier.
44. A few jurisdictions make a distinction between negligence and strict liability for
purposes of such an analysis. Some permit recovery of economic losses in negligence but
deny it for strict liability. See, eg., Ales-Peratis Foods Int., Inc. v. American Can Co., 164
Cal. App. 3d 277, 285, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1985); Corp. Air Fleet of Tennessee v. Gates
1986]
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The minority view, announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Santor v. A&M Karaghensian, Inc.,45 allows recovery of such dam-
ages in all instances. In Santor the plaintiff purchased carpet which
developed unsightly lines after only a few months of use.
4 6
Although the carpet had been purchased from a third party, the
plaintiff sued the manufacturer for damages associated with diminu-
tion in value of the carpet. Despite lack of privity, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff could maintain an action for breach of
implied warranty.47 In dicta, the court noted that the plaintiff
could have maintained an action in strict liability as well.4"
In support of this latter conclusion the court pointed out that
the manufacturer is in a better position to insure against such losses
and to spread their risk. Placing such burden on the manufacturer
is justified because the manufacturer places its goods on the market
with "a representation that they are suitable and safe for the in-
tended use . . . ."'I Liability in such instances should not depend
upon "the intricacies of the law of sales."' 0
In further support of the Santor approach, it has been argued
that a consumer is not always provided adequate protection by the
law of sales."1 Protection may be denied because the consumer
failed to give timely notice of a breach, because warranties were
effectively disclaimed, or because the plaintiff was not in privity
with the defendant.5 2 Recovery in negligence has also been sup-
ported by the idea that the manufacturer owes a separate duty to
Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (applying Tennessee law). In contrast,
Ohio permits recovery of economic losses in actions based on strict liability but not those
based in negligence. See Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d
267 (1975). For purposes of this article no distinction is drawn between recovery in strict
liability or negligence. Unless otherwise specified, the two theories are lumped together in a
general category referred to as "tort product liability." Excluded from this term are actions
for negligent misrepresentation, negligent and intentional interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage, professional malpractice and fraud. Although tort theories, they are gener-
ally not considered to be a part of product liability law.
45. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
46. Id. at 54, 207 A.2d at 307.
47. Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 310.
48. Id. at 58-59, 207 A.2d at 311-13.
49. Id. at 58, 207 A.2d at 311.
50. Id. at 59, 207 A.2d at 312. The diminution in value damages allowed in Santor are
considered direct economic losses. This is the difference in value of the product if it had been
as expected and its actual value. In subsequent cases, New Jersey has also permitted the
recovery in tort products liability of indirect economic losses - those associated with repair
costs and loss of profits. See Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J. Super.
22, 465 A.2d 530 (1983). In Spring Motors, it was also noted that Santor is not applicable to a
dispute between merchants.
51. See Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes, 647 P.2d 334 (Mont. 1982).
52. See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 164 (1972).
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the user or consumer to exercise due care to avoid foreseeable harm,
regardless of the type of harm suffered.5 3 As stated by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Berg v. General Motors Corp.,
[a] manufacturer intending and foreseeing that its product would
eventually be purchased by persons operating commercial ven-
tures, owes such persons the duty not to impair that purchaser's
commercial operations by a faulty product. The negligent manu-
facture of such an article sold, poses the foreseeable risk that the
output of the entire enterprise would be diminished or even tem-
porarily halted. The specie of harm generated by such work
stoppage (lost profits) is well within the zone of danger created
and foreseen by the negligent act.54
Several months after Santor, the California Supreme Court
announced in Seely v. White Motor Co.55 what has become the ma-
jority rule in this area. In Seely, the plaintiff sought recovery of
damages associated with a defect in his truck which allegedly
caused it to overturn. The plaintiff sought two types of damages:
(1) repair costs for the accident damage, and (2) return of the
purchase price and lost profits unrelated to the accident. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff could recover the
second category of damages on the basis of breach of express war-
ranty.56 In dicta, the court also concluded that the plaintiff could
not recover such losses in an action for strict liability in the absence
of personal injury or property damage.5 ' The court reasoned that
such economic losses, resulting solely from failure of the truck to
live up to the expectations of the plaintiff, are not properly the sub-
ject of a tort action. To permit such recovery would interfere with
the parties' right to freely contract.
5 8
53. See Hebstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Lang v.
General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v.
Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Air Products
and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); Con-
tra, Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978).
54. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 592-93, 555 P.2d 818, 823 (1976). But see Investors Premium
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45-46 (D. S.C. 1974)(where the court disallowed
a negligence claim because it was merely a restatement of the plaintiff's breach of contract
claim). Accord Boone Valley Coop. Proc. Assoc. v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp.
606, 613 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
55. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
56. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
57. Id., at 16, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
58. Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical inju-
ries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest
on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury.
The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsi-
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Criticizing Santor, the court stated that recovery in strict liabil-
ity should be limited to those situations where there has been per-
sonal injury or property damage caused by the product being
unsafe." Here, unlike Santor, there was a claim for property dam-
age. However, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed
to prove "that the defect caused the physical damage to the
truck."' 60 Finding that this conclusion was supported by the evi-
dence, the supreme court affirmed.
Following the reasoning of Seely and subsequent cases, the fed-
eral district court in Wisconsin, applying California law, denied re-
covery for negligent development of a computer system in Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp.61 In that case the plaintiff sought
damages for lost customers, income and goodwill, lost executive
time dealing with the problems, additional hardware and software
expenses, and miscellaneous expenses for office forms, personnel
and maintenance. All of these damages were considered by the
court to be associated with an economic loss only-failure of the
purchaser to obtain the benefit of its bargain. Quoting the recent
Ninth Circuit decision of S. W. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Interna-
tional62 the court stated:
Where the suit is between a nonperforming seller and an ag-
grieved buyer and the injury consists of damage to the goods
themselves and the costs of repair of such damages or a loss of
profits that the deal had been expected to yield to the buyer, it
would be sensible to limit the buyer's rights to those provided by
the Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations omitted.] To treat
such a breach as an accident is to confuse disappointment with
disaster. Whether the complaint is cast in terms of strict liability
bility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can ap-
propriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring
his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that
create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of perform-
ance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the prod-
uct was designed to meet the consumer's demand. A consumer should not be
charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged
with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless
the manufacturer agrees that it will.
Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
59. Id. California no longer requires that the defect make'the product unreasonably
dangerous before strict liability recovery will be permitted. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433.
60. 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
61. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
62. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
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in tort or negligence should make no difference. 63
According to the court, damages of this type should only be recov-
erable in an action for breach of contract. 64
Although California itself no longer appears to follow Seely, at
least in negligence actions, 65 the majority of American jurisdictions
do so for both negligence and strict liability and will not permit
recovery of economic losses absent personal injury or property
damage.66
There are several policy reasons for exclusion of economic
losses in a tort products liability action. The most often repeated
justification is that such recovery would undermine legislative intent
in enacting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). 67 Article 2 of
63. Id. at 1376.
64. Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. at 791-92.
65. In light of the California Supreme Court's decision in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24
Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979), Seely probably no longer represents the
law in California as to actions sounding in negligence. In J'Aire, it was alleged that the
defendant negligently completed construction work on premises leased by the plaintiff and
that such negligence delayed completion of the work, thereby damaging the plaintiff. Eco-
nomic loss recovery was permitted under a theory of negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage.
66. See Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, 354
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984) (negligence); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, 350 N.W.2d 591
(N.D. 1984) (strict liability); Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425
(10th Cir. 1984) (strict liability - New Mexico law); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-
Manville Salem Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Civ. 1980) (strict liability - Illinois); Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Lakeshore, Inc., 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985) (negligence and strict liability - New
Mexico); La Suer Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981) (negligence -
Minnesota); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 1984), afi'd, 771
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) (negligence - Indiana law); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (negligence and strict liability - Penn-
sylvania); Star Furniture Co. v. Polaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (strict
liability - West Va.); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 81-85, 61 Il. Dec.
746, 751-56, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-53 (1982); Nat'l Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Pittway v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1981); Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 64
Ill. Dec. Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Baltimore Football Club v. Lockheed
Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (negligence - Georgia); N. States Power Co. v. Int.
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108 (D. Minn. 1982) (negligence and strict liability - Minne-
sota); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1985); Corporate Air
Fleet of Tennessee, Inc. v. Gates Leariet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); Schia-
vone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, rev'g 81 A.D.2d 221, 439 N.Y.S.2d
933 (1st Dep. 1981).
67. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145,45 Cal. Rptr. 17; Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 652 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1980); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443; Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279
(Alaska 1976); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127
Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976); Note, Products Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception
in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 963 (1977-78); Zizzo, Vaughn v. Gen-
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the U.C.C. is designed to regulate the conduct of parties in a sale of
goods context. It provides a parol evidence rule,68 express and im-
plied warranty provisions,6 9 a notice requirement,70 rules regarding
disclaimer of warranties, 7 limitations of liability,72 and a statute of
limitations.73 Although the U.C.C. would permit a manufacturer to
disclaim warranties or limit its liability for economic losses, pre-
cluding full recovery in contract, the manufacturer might still find
itself liable for such recovery in strict liability or negligence. Tort
liability generally cannot be disclaimed or limited.74  To permit
such recovery in tort would therefore frustrate legislative and, pre-
sumably, the parties' intent.
The U.C.C. also limits recovery of economic losses to those
which were reasonably foreseeable.75 Tort recovery, on the other
hand, extends to all damages proximately caused by the defect, re-
gardless of foreseeability. To allow such expanded recovery in a
sale of goods context would again frustrate legislative intent and
would place too onerous a burden upon the manufacturer. 76 This
would in turn result in higher prices charged to all purchasers of the
product, a result which may be contrary to everyone's wishes.
As further justification for excluding recovery of economic
losses, courts have looked at the basic distinction between tort and
contract law. The question of recovery of economic losses is viewed
as part of the larger question of what distinguishes tort law from
contract law.77 The fundamental difference is in the type of inter-
ests protected. Tort law is concerned with the protection of free-
dom from various types of harm and is based on social policy.
Contract law, on the other hand, is concerned with the protection of
eral Motors Corporation: Limiting Defective Product Tort Loss Recovery, 18 J. MAR. L. REV.
525 (1985).
68. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1986).
69. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314 (1986).
70. U.C.C. § 2-607 (1986).
71. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1986).
72. U.C.C. §§ 2-718, 2-719 (1986).
73. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1986).
74. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 79, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
Contra, Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
See Note, supra note 13.
75. See supra note 10.
76. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91 11. 2d at 75, 435 N.E.2d at 451-52;
TWA. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), affid, 2 App. Div.
2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956) app. denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 745, 153 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1956);
Note, supra note 60 at 964.
77. Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Il1. App. 3d 194, 198, 364 N.E.2d
100, 104 (1977).
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interests and rights created by contract.78
[T]he line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing
interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of
risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. These factors
bear directly on whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law
or the expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty law is
most applicable to a particular claim.7
Claims of economic losses are generally associated with failure of
some standard of quality of the product. This standard should be
defined by reference to the agreement between the parties and
should be governed by contract law.80
This distinction between tort and contract law was the specific
basis for the federal district court's denial of recovery on a claim of
negligence in Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.s" There,
the plaintiff attempted to assert four causes of action in connection
with the sale of an inadequate computer system. The second cause
of action alleged that the defendant's conduct was "careless, negli-
gent, willful and wanton, through faulty design, manufacture,
etc."8 2 According to the court, this was nothing more than a re-
statement of the first cause of action alleging breach of warranty,
and this second claim was disallowed. 3
A final justification for excluding recovery of economic losses
in tort actions is to permit the parties to allocate, as they please,
costs associated with the risk of loss. 4 To impose tort liability for
economic losses would make the manufacturer the insurer of the
quality of the goods. The cost of providing this insurance will cer-
tainly be passed on to purchasers. Instead, purchasers should be
free to avoid such additional cost if they desire and to rely instead
on the safeguards provided by the U.C.C.85
78. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984).
79. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d
Cir. 1981).
80. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978).
81. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D. S.C. 1974).
82. Id. at 42.
83. Id. at 45-46.
84. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443.
85. Id. It has been suggested that the rule against recovery of economic losses in a tort
products liability action should only apply to the purchaser, and then only in favor of those
from whom the purchaser could have obtained contractual relief (but for the existence of a
disclaimer of warranties or limitation of liability). See Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort,
121 I1. App. 3d 599, 459 N.E.2d 1085 (1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 105 Ill.2d 474, 475
N.E.2d 822 (1985). However, in this type of case, it is the purchaser who is most likely to
suffer economic loss. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
at 288-89. It is the purchaser alone who would have failed to receive the benefit of his bar-
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This rationale was used by the Illinois Court of Appeals in
Black, Jackson & Simmons Insurance Brokerage v. IBM Corp. 6 to
deny recovery for negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a com-
puter system. In Black, the plaintiff had approached IBM to dis-
cuss the possibility of computerizing its operations, and IBM
recommended one of its computers with software from another ven-
dor. The computer system proved to be inadequate, and the plain-
tiff sued to collect lost profits, salaries, office supplies and
accounting and leasing expenses. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendants because Illinois law did not permit re-
covery of economic losses in a negligence action. The appellate
court affirmed, concluding that the damages suffered were in no
way unexpected but were simply associated with failure of the prod-
uct to function appropriately. According to the court, such loss is
ill-suited for tort law.
If the courts allow parties to circumvent their contractual reme-
dies by suing in tort, the ability of contracting parties to allocate
and bargain for risk of loss will be effectively destroyed and cer-
tainty in commercial transactions will be radically undermined.87
V. RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE
The majority rule, as represented by Seely, denies recovery of
economic losses in a tort product liability action but permits recov-
ery of personal injury or property damage. Personal injury encom-
passes any losses directly associated with physical injury to a
person's body, including medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost
wages, diminished earning capacity, and mental anguish. Property
damage normally refers to damage to property other than the defec-
tive product. For example, if an industrial robot went out of con-
trol because of a software defect and ran into a wall, thereby
damaging the wall and the robot, only damage to the wall would be
considered property damage. Damage to the defective robot would
be considered a form of economic loss.8
Personal injury and property damage were present in Arizona
gain. Furthermore, damages for such loss would usually be sought from the seller or manu-
facturer, from whom the purchaser could normally obtain relief in contract, unless effectively
disclaimed. Therefore, the viability of this suggestion shall not be dealt with in this article.
86. 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282 (1982).
87. Id. at 134, 440 N.E.2d at 283.
88. See supra note 4.
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State Highway Department v. Becktold. 9 There, an automobile ac-
cident ensued when a faulty turn signal caused two cars to collide.
Eighteen months prior to the accident, the then existing intersection
controls had been replaced by a complicated electronic computer-
type control which sensed traffic load and optimized flow. An inte-
gral part of this system was a relay which had gone bad, causing the
malfunction. Just prior to the accident the defendant had at-
tempted to replace the relay, but allegedly had been negligent in
doing so. The plaintiff in this action, one of the drivers involved in
the accident, was permitted to recover in negligence for damage to
his car and minor personal injuries. Although this action was not
against the developer of the computerized traffic control system, it
is likely that the Department would have been entitled to indemnity
from such developer had the system been faulty when installed.
There have been exceptions to the general rule permitting re-
covery in tort for damage to other property. It has been held that,
where the property damage is only minor in comparison to the eco-
nomic losses suffered, recovery will not be permitted.90 For exam-
ple, in Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates
Architects, Inc.91 the court denied recovery where defective bricks
manufactured by the defendant had to be removed from a building
and replaced. Although the plaintiff argued that this resulted in
damage to the mortar used to install the bricks, which was admit-
tedly other property, the court concluded that this damage was mi-
nor in comparison to the cost of replacing the bricks. This minor
loss would not justify recovery.92
Recovery in tort for damage to other property has also been
denied in a number of cases because such loss was associated with
the main function of the product and was readily foreseeable by the
contracting parties.93 It is presumed that the parties have in mind
at the time of contracting that the product may be defective and
may not be able to perform its intended tasks.
All products carry the risk that they will serve their intended
function poorly. In this sense, the risk of "ordinary" malfunc-
tions is well within the contemplation of the average purchaser.
89. 105 Ariz. 125, 460 P.2d 179 (1969).
90. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, 354 N.W.2d
816 (Minn. 1984).
91. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
92. Id. at 820.
93. Fireman's Fund Amer. Ins. Co. v. Burns Elec. Sec., 93 Ill. App. 3d 198, 417 N.E.2d
131 (1980); Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981);
Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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[citations omitted] This view comports with common sense as
well as with the underlying purpose of strict products liability,
which is to protect consumers from products which are unrea-
sonably unsafe, not from those which are merely ineffective. [ci-
tations omitted]94
All losses foreseeable from such failure should be recoverable, if at
all, in an action for breach of contract. As with economic losses,
they are not the kind of losses that tort law was designed to protect
against.
An example of this type of loss was claimed in Fireman's Fund
American Insurance Co. v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc. 91
There, the insurer of the purchaser of an alarm service was denied
relief in strict liability from the supplier of the services for losses
incurred when the system failed to work and a theft occurred. The
system was designed to send an electronic signal to the police and
the service headquarters whenever an unauthorized entry occurred.
For some undisclosed reason, the system failed to respond in this
instance.
The complaint alleged breach of warranty, negligence and
strict liability. The lower court limited recovery on the first two
counts to the terms of an exculpatory clause in the contract between
the insured and the security service. The third count was stricken.
Strict liability recovery was unavailable, according to the court, be-
cause the theft loss was considered to be the normal risk associated
with a defective alarm system. Even assuming that the theft loss
could be construed as property damage, the court concluded:
We see no reason to make the presence or absence of physical
harm the determining factor; the distinguishing central feature of
economic loss is not its purely physical characteristic, but its re-
lation to what the product was supposed to accomplish. For ex-
ample, if a fire alarm fails to work and a building burns down,
that is 'economic loss' even though the building was physically
harmed; but if the fire is caused by a short circuit in the fire
alarm itself, that is not economic loss. 9 6
The court went on to state that other harms "peripheral" to the
normal function of the product would be recoverable in tort. For
example, if the alarm put off a stench which drove customers away,
causing loss of profits, this would be recoverable in tort. In addi-
tion, personal injury damages, even though associated with the nor-
94. Purvis v. Consol. Energy Products Co., 674 F.2d 217, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1982).
95. 93 111. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980).
96. Id. at 300, 417 N.E.2d at 133.
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mal function of the product, would be recoverable.97
The loss here, regardless of its form, was economic. The "fun-
damental character" of the insured's complaint was that "it was
sold a poor burglar alarm." 98 The loss suffered was not merely a
side effect of the system's operation. "The soundness of the system
was the core of the commercial bargain." 99 According to the court,
the insured should have known that the system might fail and
should have protected against it."°° If it did not do so, it must suffer
the loss.'" 1
Notwithstanding the logic of this analysis, most of the reported
cases where foreseeable property damage has been sustained have
permitted recovery."0 2 For example, in Oldham's Farm Sausage
Co. v. Salco, Inc., 03 the plaintiff was permitted to recover in both
warranty and strict liability because of a defect in a sausage chilling
machine. The machine was designed as a fully automated conveyor
system for chilling and packaging sausage. After installation, the
system malfunctioned at various places along the conveyor, causing
destruction of sausage and propylene glycol used in the chilling pro-
cess. This property damage was deemed sufficient to justify recov-
ery in strict liability."° In like fashion, the plaintiffs in Hamilton
Fixture Co. v. Anderson 105 were permitted to recover in strict liabil-
ity for damage to their home as a result of a defective humidifier.
The humidifier had put out overly humid air which damaged vari-
ous items in the home. In each case the damage suffered could eas-
ily have been anticipated from a defect directly associated with the
function of the product. In Oldham's Farm Sausage, the chilling
machine failed to chill and package correctly. In Hamilton Fixture,
the humidifier put out overly humid air. Nevertheless, the damage
done was held recoverable.10
6
Of course, it may be a fallacy to presume in the computer con-




101. Accord, Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417
(1981) (Brosky, J. concurring).
102. See, eg., Mercer v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d 61, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1982) (de-
fective combine causing crop damage); Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson, 285 So.2d 744
(Miss. 1973) (defective humidifier that damaged home); LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon,
Inc., 660 F2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981) (defective pasteurizing equipment causing milk damage).
103. 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. App. 1982).
104. Id. at 180.
105. 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973).
106. Oldham's Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo. App. 1982);
Hamilton Fixture Co., v. Anderson, 285 So.2d 744 (Miss. 1973).
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text that any type of property damage is foreseeable. Because of the
complexity and mystery of computerized products, it is hard for the
average consumer to recognize how such a product might malfunc-
tion. Nevertheless, such consumer can recognize what the particu-
lar product is expected to do. A computerized burglar alarm
system, for example, is supposed to detect intrusions. A computer-
ized traffic control system is supposed to permit traffic to flow along
only one axis at a time. When the system causes damage because of
its failure to do that which it is supposed to do, this is a failure
associated with the benefit of the bargain and may be viewed as
recoverable only in contract.
VI. DAMAGE TO THE DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
Damage to the defective product itself can be characterized by
the hypothetical situation of a defective power supply in a computer
which causes a fire, thereby damaging the computer. The com-
puter, though defective already, sustains further damage in the fire.
Although its value was diminished before the accident because of
the existence of the defect, its value is further reduced as a result of
the accident.
When a defect causes damage to the product itself, there are
conflicting views as to whether this should be recoverable in tort. It
is felt that a defect which causes only internal deterioration is not
the proper subject of a tort action. 107 Such loss is considered a form
of failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of his bargain. For
example, in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.,'
the owner of a grain storage tank sued the manufacturer in strict
liability and negligence when a crack developed in the tank. The
plaintiff sought to recover for the cost of repair and loss of use of
the tank. Such recovery was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court
which concluded:
where only the defective product is damaged, economic losses
caused by qualitative defects falling under the ambit of a pur-
chaser's disappointed expectations cannot be recovered under a
strict liability theory. Here, count I of the complaint alleged that
during the last few months of 1976 and the first few months of
107. See Indust. Uniform Rental Co., Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463
A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443
(1982); N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981);
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981);
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 1984); Minnesota Society of Fine
Arts v. Parker-Klein Asoc. Architects, 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984)..
108. 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
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1977, 'a crack developed in one of the steel plates on the second
ring of [the] tank; such crack was not discovered by plaintiff...
until such tank was being emptied on or about August 24, 1977.'
This was not the type of sudden and dangerous occurrence best
served by the policy of tort law that the manufacturer should
bear the risk of hazardous products.10 9
The court applied this reasoning to the plaintiff's negligence claim
as well. 110
While some courts simply refuse to recognize damage to the
defective product itself as property damage, compensable in tort, 111
most others have found special circumstances to justify recovery.
One such special circumstance permits tort recovery if the damage
resulted from a sudden or calamitous event.' 12 For example, in Bi-
Petro Refining Co. v. Hartness Painting, Inc.," 3 the Illinois Appel-
late Court permitted recovery for damage to a storage tank,
notwithstanding the prior decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Moorman. In Bi-Petro, unlike Moorman, the damage resulted from
a sudden rupture of the tank which was considered a calamitous
event.' 14
Another such calamitous event might be recognized in the hy-
pothetical situation of a microcomputer with a defective hard disk
controller. If the controller malfunctions causing the read-write
head to crash, thus damaging the heads, the disk and data on the
disk, this crash may be viewed as a calamitous event. This would
then give rise to recovery for the damage done.
109. Id. at 85, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
110. Id.
111. See A. C. Hoyle Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 128 Mich. App. 557, 340 N.W.2d 326
(1983); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); Tri-State
Ins. Co. v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 364 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. App. 1985). But see Long Mfg., N.C.,
Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976), where such recovery
was permitted in negligence, but not strict liability.
112. See Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982);
Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971). Contra, State v.
Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). In some
instances a calamitous event may be hard to define. Generally, it is some type of accident.
However, "[w]ith some products an 'accident' may not be clearly distinguishable from inter-
nal deterioration." Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1171 n.19 (3d Cir. 1981). For example, a flood caused by a defective storm and surface
removal system was considered a natural accumulation of water, and not a calamitous event
in Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Charles W. Greengard Assoc., 119 Ill. App. 3d 376, 456 N.E.2d 635
(1983). In close cases the determination must be made "by analyzing interrelated factors
such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which injury arose."
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir.
1981).
113. 120 Ill. App. 3d 556, 458 N.E.2d 209 (1983).
114. Id. at 559, 458 N.E.2d at 212.
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Another special circumstance has been recognized where the
defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or to
his property.11 Such an exception might have been used in the pre-
viously noted case of the faulty burglar alarm system.' 16 Clearly, a
defect in such a system would pose danger to the user or his prop-
erty. Unfortunately, the court did not consider this in its discussion
except insofar as it noted that, if personal injury were threatened,
the result might be different. 17
Of course, this exception may be nothing more than a recogni-
tion that strict liability recovery requires that the product be unrea-
sonably dangerous."' Therefore, at least in the case of strict
liability, this is an exception that practically does away with the
distinction between damage to the defective product and damage to
other property.
Recovery of damages for injury to the defective product itself
in situations involving unreasonable danger or a calamitous event is
consistent with the general purposes of tort and contract law. Con-
tract law is intended to protect the expectations of the parties to a
contractual relationship. While the purchaser is expected to protect
his expectations through the mechanism of the contract, he is not
expected to anticipate that the product may contain a defect which
would make it unreasonably dangerous or cause a calamitous event.
The user is not expected to have to bargain for a safe product.11 9
While most courts which recognize the exception for unreason-
ably dangerous defects permit recovery whether or not a calamitous
event occurs,1 20 a minority require both an unreasonably dangerous
115. See, eg., Vulcan Material Co. v. Driltech, c., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983);
N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981); Berkeley
Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).
116. See Fireman's Fund Amer. Ins. Co. v. Burns Electronic Security, 93 I11. App. 3d
298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980).
117. Id. at 134.
118. See John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Crott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d
512 (1979); Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128
(1983). This, of course, assumes that the particular jurisdiction follows the Restatement defi-
nition of strict liability. See supra discussion.
119. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.
1981); Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d
816 (Minn. 1984); Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984),
In Vaughn, the court noted that the plaintiff was not simply trying to recover for the fact that
the truck failed to meet the purchaser's expectations. It is reasonable for a user to expect to
repair or replace mechanical parts after a time. However, it is not reasonable for the pur-
chaser to anticipate that a defect might result in the destruction of the product. See, Zizzo,
Vaughn v. General Motors Corp.: Limiting Objective Product Tort Loss Recovery, 18 L. Rev.
525, 535 (1985).
120. In support of permitting recovery even where a calamitous event does not occur, it
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defect and a calamitous event. 121
In situations where damage to the defective product itself is not
recoverable, either because no calamitous event has occurred or
otherwise, some plaintiffs have sought recovery by defining the de-
fective product as a component of the whole and defining the re-
mainder as "other property." '122 For example, in the computer
context, defective software might be viewed as a separate product
which operates to cause the hardware to somehow be damaged. In
most instances this type of argument has failed. 123 To accept this
reasoning, according to most courts, would be to effectively do
away with the rule prohibiting recovery for damage to the defective
product.24 Virtually any defect can eventually be localized to a
particular component of the product.125 In the software context,
this argument might be taken one step further to define the defec-
tive product as a subroutine or even a single line of code. A com-
puter program which then malfunctions by causing garbage to be
written over other parts of the software, a common occurrence,
would give rise to damage to other property. Notwithstanding this
criticism, a few courts have accepted this argument and have al-
lowed recovery.1
26
has been argued that to hold otherwise would be to draw an arbitrary line. There is no logical
basis for disallowing recovery simply because a defect is discovered before an accident occurs.
As stated by Justice Peters in Seely:
I cannot rationally hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an acci-
dent caused by a defective part may recover his property damage under a given
theory while another plaintiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the
defect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other damages
proximately caused by an identical defective part. The strict liability rule
should apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be validly
distinguished.
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d at 22 n.2, 403 P.2d at 154 n.2, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.2
(1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
It has similarly been argued that there is no logical reason to allow or disallow recovery
simply on the basis of how the loss occurs. See Zizzo, supra note 119 at 525.
121. See, eg., TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955).
122. See, eg., Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel,Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 666
P.2d 544 (1983); N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska
1981); Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d
816 (Minn. 1984); R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1983); American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool and Machine, Inc., 767 F.2d 446 (8th
Cir. 1985).
123. See supra note 122.
124. Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984).
125. Id.
126. See, eg., Air Products and Chemical, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis.2d 193,
206 N.W.2d 414 (1973)(applying Pennsylvania law); Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246
Cal.App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966). It has been suggested that the success of this
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VII. WHEN PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE IS
PRESENT, WHAT DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE?
Under the minority view, all damages proximately caused by a
defect, whether economic or otherwise, are recoverable if a cause of
action in tort product liability can be stated. Under the majority
view, however, recovery in tort is only permitted if there has been
personal injury, property damage or damage to the defective prod-
uct from a calamitous event or unreasonably dangerous defect.
Under this view, a determination that recovery will be permitted is
only the first step. Next it must be determined which elements of
the plaintiff's damages may be recovered. It is in this second step
that most of the reported decisions have provided little guidance.
Most such decisions simply conclude that economic losses are re-
coverable, and do not pursue the analysis any further. Logically, it
may be assumed from this silence that these courts have concluded
that all damages are recoverable. This would arguably eliminate
the need for further analysis.
In those few cases where the question has been addressed, how-
ever, results have varied. Some courts have permitted recovery of
all damages 127 on the basis that recovery should turn on whether or
not a compensable loss has been suffered.' 28 If so, recovery of all
losses sustained is justified.
In contrast, some courts have permitted recovery of that por-
tion of the plaintiff's damages associated with a compensable loss,
such as personal injury or property damage, but have excluded re-
covery of all other damages sustained.1 29 For example, in Mercer v.
Long Mfg., N. C., Inc., 30 the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, per-
mitted recovery on the theory of strict liability for damage to the
plaintiff's peanut crop caused by a defective combine. The plaintiff
component part approach should depend upon who is the defendant. See Note, Oregon
Adopts the Degree of Danger Test for Strict Tort Liability-The Implied Warranty Alternative,
58 OR. L. REv. 545 (1980). If the defendant is the seller of the entire computer system, then
the system should be viewed as the product. If, on the other hand, the defendant is only the
developer of the software, then the software should be viewed as the product, and the rest of
the computer system as other property. While this approach has some appeal, it would ap-
pear to threaten circumvention of legislative intent and that of the parties by providing tort
recovery in instances where it should only be available in contract.
127. Le Sueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981); Two Rivers
Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920
(1981).
128. See Apel, Strict Liability; Recovery of "Economic Loss", 13 IDAHo L. REV. 29
(1976).
129. Mercer v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982); Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
130. 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982).
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had sought damages for 1) diminution in value of the combine be-
cause of the existence of a defect, 2) cost of interim repairs, 3) losses
due to deterioration of crops while the combine was unusable,
4) loss of marketable hay which is normally produced during com-
bine operation, and 5) loss of marketable peanut crop which was
dropped during faulty operation of the combine. Of these claims,
only the last was considered property damage and recoverable. The
rest were purely economic losses unassociated with the damaged
crop. 131
Recovery of the economic loss portion of damages was likewise
excluded in John R. Dudley Construction, Inc. v. Drott Manfactur-
ing Co.1 32 In that case, a crane was seriously damaged as a result of
defective bolts which permitted it to collapse. The plaintiff was per-
mitted to recover for damage to the crane, caused as it was by a
calamitous event, but no such recovery was permitted for diminu-
tion in value of the crane because of the presence of defective
bolts. 133
The logic of this approach seems clear. Losses associated with
failure of the product to meet the purchaser's expectations are not
recoverable under the majority rule. Why should such losses there-
after become recoverable simply because of the fortuity of a calami-
tous event which causes recoverable damage to other property or
the defective product? To permit this would lead to the anomaly of
denying recovery of diminished value to the party who discovers a
defect before the product causes damage but permitting such recov-
ery where the product is allowed to cause other damage. The ques-
tion of recovery should not be left to turn on such fortuitous
circumstances.
For example, a party with a defective hard disk controller in
his microcomputer should not be able to recover the cost of repair-
ing that controller simply because a head crash occurs which fur-
ther diminishes the value of the microcomputer. If a
microcomputer owner could not recover such damages in a tort ac-
tion before a calamitous event occurs, he should equally not be able
to do so thereafter.
In other cases where recovery has been permitted in tort for
personal injury or property damage, recovery has nevertheless been
131. Id. at 67, 68.
132. 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979).
133. Actually the plaintiff had not sought recovery in tort for such diminished value.
These damages were insignificant compared to damage done to the crane. However, the fact
that the court made a point of mentioning the failure of the plaintiff to seek such damages
indicates that the court probably would not have allowed such recovery if it had been sought.
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excluded for any indirect economic losses. For example, in Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co.,134 the West Virginia
Supreme Court, answering questions certified by the federal district
court, concluded that damage to the defective product itself could
be recovered if it resulted from a calamitous event. As in Mercer,
however, no recovery was permitted for diminution in value of the
defective product because of the presence of a defect. Recovery was
also precluded for indirect economic losses, such as lost profits, as-
sociated with the accident damage. 135
VIII. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
As the foregoing indicates, the courts have struggled to avoid
inequitable results while patterning a consistent approach to tort
product defect cases. On the one hand, these courts have been
mindful not to allow tort law to encroach on that which tradition-
ally and appropriately has been reserved for the law of contracts.
On the other hand, these courts have attempted to provide consum-
ers with protection against dangerous situations and calamitous, un-
foreseeable destruction of property. Although these attempts have
been generally successful, they have the potential for causing many
inequitable results.
A more sensible approach to these cases would be one similar
to that applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mercer v.
Long Manufacturing, N.C., Inc.,1 36 denying recovery of the eco-
nomic loss portion of damages in all tort product liability actions.
Even where a compensable loss has occurred, such as personal in-
jury or property damage, recovery should still be denied for any
separable economic losses which have been suffered because of the
defect.
For example, in the hypothetical case of a computer with a
defective hard disk drive controller, suppose the cost of repairing
the controller is $300. Suppose further that this defect made the
computer unusable for three days of the time the purchaser had it
and that repair would require another two days of down time. If
the purchaser must rent a replacement computer for his business
during those days, at $100 per day, further losses are $500. These
are all costs directly associated with failure of the purchaser to re-
ceive the benefit of his bargain.
If the defect is discovered before further problems occur, and if
134. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
135. Id. at 859.
136. 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the purchaser cannot recover from the seller or manufacturer for
breach of warranty or contract, these losses must be borne by the
purchaser, as the parties presumably intended. But, if the hard disk
drive causes a head crash which damages the read/write heads and
the hard disk, and such accident does $1000 in damage to the com-
puter, the purchaser should be able to recover this $1000. This
would be viewed as simply further damage to the defective product
from a calamitous event. He should also be able to recover for loss
of use of the computer if extra time is required to repair it beyond
the two days already needed. No recovery should be permitted,
however, for the $800 economic losses directly associated with the
presence of a defect.
Unlike the conclusion of the West Virginia Supreme Court in
Star Furniture, however, recovery in tort should be permitted for
indirect damages suffered as a result of a compensable loss. Where
property damage or personal injury exist, all damages associated
with such loss should be recoverable. 137 In the example previously
noted, if the plaintiff is unable to obtain a replacement computer
during the period its computer is down, and extra down time be-
cause of the head crash causes $1,000 in lost profits, this loss should
be equally recoverable in tort. There is no logical distinction be-
tween costs associated with renting a replacement computer during
down time and lost profits because a replacement computer could
not be obtained. Both are a result of the tortious damage to the
computer, and both should be equally compensable.
Recovery in tort should also be excluded for property damage
caused by the defective product which is associated with the normal
function of the product and presumably within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting. 138 For example, the theft
losses in Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Burns Elec-
tronic Security Services, Inc.,139 and the building damages in Ari-
zona v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 4 would not be recoverable.
Similarly, damage to the peanut crop in Mercer, 4' should not have
been recovered. Clearly, it should have been anticipated that a de-
fective combine would damage the plaintiff's crop. Such damage
137. Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes, Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972).
138. Of course, it is a legal fiction to assume that the parties had any losses in mind at the
time of contracting. Parties seldom contemplate that a product they are buying will contain a
defect. Nevertheless, except for unreasonably dangerous defects, courts consistently hold
parties responsible for anticipating such losses in their contract.
139. 93 Il1. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980).
140. 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975), affd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976).
141. 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982).
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must be distinguished, however, from that which would result if, for
example, a defective combine caught fire and burned much of the
plaintiff's fields. This is a loss peripheral to the product's normal
function. Of course, it cannot be overlooked that damages from a
defective computer product may be difficult to foresee. The sheer
complexity of such products may preclude reliance on this princi-
ple. Note, however, that damages associated with the primary func-
tion of the computerized product would normally be foreseeable.
For policy reasons, though, an exception should be made for
property damage occasioned by a calamitous event or an unreasona-
bly dangerous defect in the product. Even if anticipated, a pur-
chaser should not be required to bargain for a safe product. For
example, losses resulting from a hypothetical air disaster caused by
a defective air traffic control system, though clearly foreseeable,
should be recoverable. These are the type of losses that tort law was
meant to protect against. 142 The same would be true of a computer-
ized braking system in an automobile which failed to function cor-
rectly and caused a crash.143
From a practical standpoint, if the existence of a defect makes
the product less valuable, this loss of value is the risk contemplated
by the parties when they enter into their contract of sale. If the
defect also causes the buyer damage in his inability to use the prod-
uct, including cost of repair and lost profits, these too are losses
associated with the contract. Lastly, if such defect would normally
lead to other property damages, this also must be considered as hav-
ing been within the contemplation of the parties. If the purchaser
wishes to place the risk of such losses on the manufacturer, he bar-
gains for a warranty. If no warranty exists, it is presumed that the
parties intended the risk to be placed on the buyer. The buyer
should not then be able to recover such losses if the product also
causes recoverable injury to person or property.
This approach is also consistent with the policy considerations
cited by the courts. It is clearly consistent with the legislative pur-
pose in enacting the U.C.C. Those damages which would normally
be recoverable under the U.C.C. where no personal injury or prop-
erty damages occur are the very ones which would not be recover-
able in a tort product liability action under this approach. A party
142. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984).
143. See Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 80 Ill. Dec. 743, 466 N.E.2d
195 (1984), where recovery was permitted when a faulty braking system malfunctioned and
caused an accident which damaged the vehicle. Although not a computerized braking sys-
tem, the same principal should apply.
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precluded from recovery by contract law would not be able to mask
its breach of contract claim as a tort, and thereby obtain recovery.
One of the most widely used justifications for permitting recov-
ery of damage to the defective product itself as a result of a calami-
tous event or an unreasonably dangerous defect is to give the
manufacturer incentive for producing safe products. Such incentive
is not lost under the proposed approach. If the manufacturer is lia-
ble for personal injury or property damage caused by a product
which is unreasonably dangerous or which causes an accident, this
is enough incentive. A manufacturer is induced to provide safe
products by the threat of high damage claims if he does not do so.
Under the proposed approach, the manufacturer is threatened that
if he manufactures an unsafe product which in fact causes recover-
able damage, he will be punished by paying for such damage, which
could be substantial. It is unlikely that the manufacturer will over-
look the fact that an unreasonably dangerous product is more likely
to cause the more substantial personal injury and property damage.
Little if any additional incentive is supplied by the threat that, even
if no additional damage occurs, the manufacturer will have to pay
for the plaintiff's economic losses. 144
Another cited reason for permitting recovery of economic
losses is to spread the risk of loss among all purchasers and to facili-
tate insuring against such loss. It is felt that the manufacturer is
better able to obtain insurance against losses than individual pur-
chasers. The cost of such insurance, as well as the cost of self-insur-
ance, can be spread to all purchasers through higher prices. While
this is all quite true, it ignores the purposes of contract and tort law
and forces contractual terms on the parties that they might not
otherwise desire. Certainly it is a laudable purpose of tort law to
protect consumers. However, in its extreme this concern would to-
tally supplant contract law and make the manufacturer the insurer
of the quality of its products forever. As stated by Justice Thomp-
son in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.:145
The rule of strict liability for defective products is an example of
necessary paternalism judicially shifting risk of loss by applica-
tion of tort doctrine because California's statutory scheme fails to
adequately cover the situation. Judicial paternalism is to loss
shifting what garlic is to stew-sometimes necessary to give full
flavor to statutory law, always distinctly noticeable in its result,
144. In most cases the purely economic loss portion of damages will be much smaller
than those associated with personal injury or property damage.
145. 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976).
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overwhelmingly counterproductive if excessive, and never an end
in itself.146
Strict liability has been universally recognized as a necessary
act of judicial paternalism to provide protection to purchasers and
users through risk spreading. This risk spreading should not, how-
ever, be taken to the extreme sought by those who would permit
recovery of purely economic loss outside of the breach of contract
context. 147
One criticism of the proposed approach may be that it will
prove difficult to administer. In the typical situation where a defect
causes an accident which damages the defective product, it may be
difficult to allocate costs of repair between the defect and the dam-
age caused by the accident. This is especially true for repair costs
and costs associated with inability to use the product during such
repair. What period of time and cost of repair should be allocated
to repairing the defect, and what should be allocated to repairing
the accident damage?
While this criticism may be justified, it should not stand in the
way of application of a sound principle of law. This is merely an
evidentiary problem. The same criticism is equally applicable to sit-
uations involving allocation of fault in comparative negligence juris-
dictions and contribution among joint tortfeasors. Nevertheless,
those principles have been applied by the courts and have become
standard tort law. Any evidentiary problems encountered by the
approach proposed here must simply be resolved as they are
encountered.
The benefits of this approach are many. Besides those already
discussed regarding avoidance of inequitable results simply because
of the fortuity of a calamitous event or a defect which is considered
unreasonably dangerous, this approach places the burden squarely
on the contracting parties to allocate risk of contract losses as appro-
priate. Without the unnecessary protections of tort product liability
recovery for economic losses, the parties will have greater incentive
146. Id. at 747, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
147. It might be argued that judicial paternalism is necessary because of the typical bar-
gaining process in consumer goods sales. That process involves a product sold with an agree-
ment that contains a disclaimer of warranties and/or limitation of liabilities. Typically the
user has no opportunity to bargain over such terms of the agreement. Under the approach
proposed here such user would be left with no redress for economic losses. That user should,
therefore, be protected. However, this again is a matter of contract law. If it is deemed unfair
to hold the user to such a clause, contract law should provide protection. Sanco, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 1984). This could be done through the recognition of
contracts of adhesion and unconscionable agreements. These legal mechanisms should be
sufficient to provide the consumer adequate protection without resorting to tort law.
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to do so. The contracting parties will be free to allocate as they
desire and are able. To the extent this might result in an unfair
advantage to the savvy seller, contract law must be counted on to
provide protection.
In the context of damage to the defective product itself, an-
other benefit provided by this approach is that it permits recovery
for such damage whenever it is outside of the normal contemplation
of the parties. This does away with the strict necessity of an unrea-
sonably dangerous defect or a calamitous event. It also avoids the
problem of damage to other property which is only slight in com-
parison to all damages and the strained attempts at providing recov-
ery by viewing the defective product as only a component and
allowing recovery for damage to the rest of the product. Whenever
damage is done to the defective product itself, this damage alone
will be recoverable in tort, regardless of its magnitude or where in
the product it occurs.
Also in the context of damage to the defective product itself,
this approach is consistent with basic logic. A product with a defect
normally has a diminished value to the owner. This value relates to
the cost of repair and downtime during repair. In addition, up until
the time of an accident or other damaging event, the product may
have failed to operate as expected or at all, thereby causing lost
profits and costs associated with attempts to fix the problem. All
such costs have already been incurred by the user prior to the time
the product is damaged. Because such costs are associated with the
normal function of the product, they should be recoverable only in
an action for breach of contract. They reflect a failure of the pur-
chaser to receive the benefit of his bargain.
After an unforeseeable accident or other event which damages
the product, its value will presumably have been diminished further.
The loss incurred by the user because of this accident or event, then,
is only the further amount by which the product's value has been
diminished and costs associated with any further downtime that re-
sults. It is this loss, alone, which should be recoverable in tort.
For example, if a $5,000 computer has a defect in its power
supply which would require $500 in repair costs and downtime ex-
penses to fix, the computer is presumably only worth $4,500 to the
owner. He must put $500 into the computer to bring it's value back
to $5,000. If that computer is then totally destroyed by a fire before
repairs are undertaken, what has the owner lost? Since the com-
puter was only worth $4,500 to him at the time, this is all that has
been lost. This is all that should be recovered in tort. Any other
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recovery would be a windfall simply because of the fortuity of an
accident. Such fortuity should not be the basis for recovery.
IX. CONCLUSION
Where a product, such as a computer or a computerized
machine, malfunctions and causes personal injury or property dam-
age to the purchaser or user, such damage is universally recoverable
in a tort product liability action. Where the defect causes injury to
the defective product alone, recovery is also normally permitted if
the injury resulted from an unreasonably dangerous defect in the
product or a calamitous event. When recovery is permitted in a
given situation, there is uncertainty as to whether all damages
should then be recoverable or simply those which are not purely
economic.
Economic losses are those associated with failure of the pur-
chaser to receive the benefit of his bargain-diminished value of the
product because of the existence of a defect, cost of repairs and
costs associated with malfunction of the product or inability to use
it. Such losses are the normal result of a computer defect. Eco-
nomic losses alone should not be recoverable in a tort product liabil-
ity action. They should be recoverable, if at all, under the law of
contracts. This conclusion should not then change simply because
the product also causes personal injury or property damage. To
permit such recovery would result in a windfall.
Tort law should also not be available to provide relief in a situ-
ation where the only losses incurred are those naturally within the
contemplation of the parties. This would not, however, include
damages resulting from a calamitous event or an unreasonably dan-
gerous defect, even though otherwise foreseeable. As a matter of
public policy parties should not be held to contemplate that a prod-
uct might not be safe. Manufacturers are obligated to produce safe
products regardless of what the parties might anticipate.
Where recoverable personal injury or property damage does
exist, recovery should be permitted for all losses flowing from such
injury or damage, including lost profits. As long as the requirement
to mitigate damages does not require that the injured party find
some means to avoid lost profits, such as obtaining replacement
equipment, there is no rational basis for excluding such recovery.
The trend in law in recent history has been to blur the distinc-
tion between tort and contract law and to provide injured parties
with all means possible for obtaining recovery. While this is a desir-
able end, the damage it does to general contract principles is a cause
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of some concern. The approach proposed here is an attempt to
bring the basic principles of law back on track and to restore to the
parties their right to freely contract.

